### India's New Competition Law – Competition Act, 2002

Lecture by

# Shri Vinod Dhall, Member & acting Chairman Competition Commission Of India

at

JAGANNATH INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SCHOOL

New Delhi

25 January, 2008

### Competition Act, 2002 - Objective

Competition Act, 2002 notified in January, 2003. Stated objective in Preamble is to provide "for the establishment of a Commission" to:

- Eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition.
- Promote and sustain competition.
- Protect interests of consumers.
- Ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets in India.

(see also sec 18)

### Competition Act, 2002 - Main features

- I Prohibits Anti Competitive Agreements. (Sec 3)
- II Prohibits Abuse of Dominant Position. (Sec 4)
- III Provides for Regulation of Combinations. (Sec 5,6)
- IV Enjoins Competition Advocacy. (Sec 49)

<sup>\*</sup>Off-market, not in-market. Ex-post, not ex-ante,, except in combinations.

#### I - Anti-Competitive Agreements

- Two types: Horizontal & Vertical
- •Agreement amongst competitors (horizontal agreement), including cartels *presumed* to have *appreciable adverse effect* on competition. Cartels most pernicious violation.
  - Price fixing, sharing of market, limiting production, supply, etc., bid rigging, collusive bidding.
- Agreement such as between manufacturer and distributor (vertical agreement) subject to *Rule of Reason; burden of poof lies on prosecutor*.
  - Tie-in arrangement, exclusive supply/distribution agreement, refusal to deal, resale price maintenance.
- Agreement includes arrangement or understanding, oral, or in writing, not necessarily enforceable by law

# Anti-Competitive Agreements - Example

Global Lysine cartel, decided in US (1996) – turning point in anti-cartel action:

- 5 firms (2 Japanese, 2 S.Korean, 1 US) prosecuted for forming cartel and fixing prices for 5 years.
- High penalties imposed; ADM (cartel leader) fined \$100 m.
- Rigorous investigation with help of FBI.
- Major role of economic analysis in calculation of overcharge.

#### **\*** Issues

- Direct evidence usually difficult. Might require search and seizure operation as per section 41. Might necessitate reliance on circumstantial evidence, leniency provision.
- ➤ Injury caused to developing countries by global cartels.

#### II - Abuse of Dominance

- Not dominance, but its abuse is prohibited.
- Acts deemed to be abuse are (Sec.4):
  - \*Unfair or discriminatory pricing (including predatory pricing).
  - \*Limiting production or technical development
  - \*Denial of market access.
  - \*Conclusion of contracts subject to supplementary obligations.
  - \*Use of dominant position in one market to enter into or protect the other market.
- Dominance not based on arithmetical figure, but on several factors listed in Act. Sec. 19(4).
- Relevant market needs to be first determined:
  - Relevant product market. Sec 19(7)
  - Relevant geographic market. See 19(6)

#### Abuse of Dominance - Example

United Brands company prosecuted by European Competition Commissioner.

 Court determined UB's dominance from combination of several factors.

Court held following amounted to abuse (1978):

- Refusal to supply long standing customer.
- Discriminatory pricing for equivalent transactions.
- Excessive pricing, having no reasonable relation to economic value.
- *Issues*: Determination of relevant product market, relevant geographic market economic tools available e.g. cross elasticity, substitutability, SSNIP/HMT. Factors given in section 19.
- •Another example: Microsoft case (Tying-in, denying access, using dominance in one market to enter another)

#### III-Regulation of Combinations

- Combination includes: merger and amalgamation, acquiring of control, and aquisition of shares, voting rights, assets.
- •High thresholds, including 'domestic nexus'.
- •Mandatory pre-notification before merger.
- •Commission must decide in 210 days, else combination deemed approved.
- •Combination assessed on rule of reason based on 14 factors.
- •Commission can take suo motu action within 1 year after combination.

### Regulation of Combinations - Example

FTC, US successfully opposed (1997) merger between Staples and Office Depot – two office supplies super stores:

- Court accepted "office supply super stores" as relevant market; used economic tools e.g. CR, HHI, "Brown Shoe" indices.
- Court recognized benefits to consumers by firms. But found reasonable probability that proposed merger may substantially lessen competition; rejected efficiency argument.
- \*Issues: Involves predicting future structure/conduct; factors given in section 20.
- ❖Other examples:

# IV-Competition Advocacy

- The Commission *shall* take suitable measures to:
  - Promote competition advocacy.
  - Create public awareness.
  - Impart training about competition issues.
- The Commission shall render opinion on a reference from the Central Government on a policy / law on competition; not binding.
  - [Section 49]

#### Examples of Competition Advocacy: 1

#### • Initiatives by Commission in respect of:

- Department of Posts Indian Post Office (Amendment Bill), 2006 monopoly of letter mail, USO fee, new regulator, etc.
- Department of Shipping Shipping Conferences tariff fixing; and Shipping Trade Practices Bill, 2005
- Department of Telecom & TRAI number portability, spectrum allocation, additional merger regulation, open access to telecom infrastructure
- Ministry of Civil Aviation price fixing by airline association

### Examples of Competition Advocacy: 2

- Reserve Bank of India competition issues in banking sector
- Department of Food & Public Distribution Warehousing (Development & Regulation) Bill, 2005 price monitoring by proposed regulator
- Department of Road Transport and Highways Competition oriented reforms in Passenger Road Transport (in States)
- Planning Commission model concession agreement
- Planning Co mission Competition Policy for 11<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan document.

#### Other Highlights of Act

Government departments/undertakings included [section 2(h)] i.e., Competitive Neutrality.

- Effects Doctrine [section 32].
- Relationship with Sector Regulators [section 21, 21A].
- International co-operation [proviso to section 18].

Excluded from competition scrutiny:

- Exports
- Reasonable restrictions on IPRs (patents, copyrights, etc)
- •Efficiency enhancing JVs excluded from "presumptive rule"

#### Effects doctrine

- Following liberalization/globalization, cross-border economic activity has grown enormously.
- This has increased vulnerability to overseas/cross-border economic mal-practices/offences.
- CCI's jurisdiction expressly extended to anti-competitive practices/combinations taking place outside India, but having effect in markets in India.
- This will better protect domestic markets/consumers.

#### Relationship with Sector Regulators (sec 21)

- Regulator can refer a competition issue arising in a proceeding to Commission for opinion.
  Commission to give opinion in 60 days; after which regulator may pass order.
- Similarly Commission may refer competition issue to sector regulator who must give opinion in 60 days after which Commission may pass order.

#### International cooperation

- For discharging its duties/functions, CCI can enter into memorandum/arrangement with any agency of any foreign country.
- Such arrangements important for inquiries against overseas/cross-border violations.
- International cooperation and effects doctrine mutually complementary.
- Such agreements exist between several competition authorities.

#### Competition Act - an Economic Law

Economic concepts/analysis fundamental to the Law:

Relevant market-- relevant product market, relevant geographic market. (SSNIP test)

- Dominant position. (Abuse of Dominance)
- AAEC Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition by agreements/Abuse of Dominance.
- AAEC By Combinations. (HHI, CR)

#### Competition Act and MRTP Act

#### Based on liberalized regime. Economically literate law. Not form-based but effect-based.

- Competition concepts expressly defined; major role for economic analysis
- Provides for regulation of combinations
- Provides for advocacy
- Power to impose penalty deterrence factor
- Statutory authority can seek CCI's opinion
- Sovernment Departments within its ambit.

#### Based on command and control Regime

- Competition concepts not expressly defined
- No regulation of combinations
- > Has no advocacy role
- No power to impose penalty
- No provision for statutory authorities to seek opinion
- Government Departments outside its ambit.

#### Powers of Commission

- Cease and desist order
- Penalty up to 10% of average turnover for last three preceding financial years
- In case of cartels, penalty up to 10% of turnover or three times of cartelized profit.
- To declare agreement having AAEC as void
- Order can modify agreement
- In case of Combination can be approved, approved with modification, or refused approval.
- In case of dominant enterprise order for division of dominant enterprise.

# Who can approach Commission?

- Any person; includes individual, company, firm, association, statutory corporation, government company, body corporate, legal authority, etc.
- Consumer; means one who buys goods/avails services for consideration.
- Association of persons or consumers or trade association.
- Reference by central/state government, statutory authority.
- Thus an enterprise, adversely affected, can also approach Commission.

#### How enterprises can achieve compliance?

- Compliance important because consequences potentially serious: investigation, penalty, damages, voidance of agreements, adverse publicity.
- Businesses advised to raise awareness among employees, especially those in sales, marketing, purchasing.
- Large businesses advised to <u>have formal compliance programme</u>, with four suggested features:
  - Support of senior management
  - Appropriate policy and procedures; compliance manual incorporating clear policy statement, giving provisions of competition law, examples of prohibited behavior, etc.
  - Training
  - Regular evaluation
- Compliance programme is <u>mitigating factor</u> for OFT; involvement of senior management is <u>aggravating</u> factor.

(See Guide of OFT, UK)

# Role of Trade Associations

- Functions of Trade Associations are useful to members
- May also be beneficial in increasing efficiency of markets.
- However, Trade Associations should take care not to be used directly/indirectly as vehicle for anticompetitive activity.
- Trade Associations can facilitate compliance by generating awareness, educating members, propagating compliance programme, etc.

(See Guide of OFT, UK)

#### Disclaimer



This presentation provides only an introduction to competition law, and should not be relied on as a substitute for the law itself.

Further, this presentation is subject to any amendments which may be made in the competition law at anytime in future.



### Thank you

Website:

www.competitioncommission.gov.in